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EHNEST T. SORENSEN, Respondent, v. MANUEL COSTA, 
Appellant. 
[1] Adverse Possession-Law Governing.-A person claiming titll' 
to property by adverse possession must establish his cbim 
under either Code Civ. Proc., § 322, relating to occupation un-
der a written instrument or judftment, or under §~ 324, 321), 
relating to possession under clllim of titlt' lIot written, Ilnd 
where the deeds in '1ucstion do lIot illelutle the land occupied, 
adverse possession thereof is governed 1,y §~ 1l24, 325. 
l2] ld.-Hostilit)'.-The requirmnent of "hostility" necessary to 
establish title by adverse possession mcans not thnt the parties 
lnUlit have a dispute as to the title during the period of posses-
sion, but that the claimant's possl'ssioJl must be adverse to the 
record owner, unaccompanied by auy recognition of the owner's 
right. 
[3] Id.-Hostllit)'-Occupation by Mistake.-Title by adverse pos-
session may be acquired through possl'ssion or usc commenced 
under mistake. 
[4] ld.-Duration of Possession-When Prescriptive Period Begins. 
-Where adverse posaession is based on n mistaken entry, the 
period of the statute of limitations commences to run, not from 
the discovery of the mistake, but from the time of making the 
adverse claim of right and possession thcrl'uudtlr. (Disapprov-
ing Maf'McanO v. Lu.fJing, 19 Ca1.App. 334, 336, 125 P. 10H3.) 
[6] ld.-Open and Notorious Character of Possession-Knowledge. 
-A person claiming title by adverse possession Ill'tld not es-
tablish that the record ownllr kntlw of hjs own rights in t.he 
land in question. Tho ndvel'se clnimnnt nend only I'how that 
his occupation was such as to constitute reasonable notice to 
the true owner thnt he clninlod the Innd itS his own. 
[6] ld.-Continuit)' of Possession-Tncking Successive Possessions. 
-Where a person claiming title to lllnd by adverse pass"ssion 
[3] Adverse posscssion dne to ignorance or mistake M to bound-
aries, Dote, 97 .A.L.R. H. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur. 578; 1 Am.Jur. 
914. 
[5] See 1 Oal.Jur. !l.1)(); 1 Am.Jur. 874. 
McK. Dig.-=:&eferences: [1] Adverse Poss~S8ion, 13; [2] Advl'rs(' 
Possession, § 42; [3] Adverse POs!;t'ssion, § 51; [4] Adversp PIlI<-
,",ession, § 76; [5] Advcrfle PO""l'ssion, ~ 72; [6-8] Adver!!e PO,1~1'!\­
$ion, § 85; [9] Ad\"c~(' Pos;;r.~~ion, ~ HiR; [lll, 13] Adv"rsp. Po.,,·"s-
sion, § 102; [11, U] Adverse Post;cflsion, § fo)6i [12] Taxl:Ition, ~ 167. 
/ 
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did Dol hiw~l'lf ptl~S~SS or oel~up'y I III' lund rl)r five yearll, it j,.. 
nI!CI!s~nry for him to rl'ly 011 thr. Jl(Js~I'ssions of his pr('d('ce!l~or.' 
to ('stnhlisb continuoull PO!lsf'IIKion for th" prcserib('d pl'rio<1. 
Ilnd in order to tack on(' p(!rson'f' posllcslIion to thut of anoth!'}', 
1I0B1l' form of privity b(·two·I·n 811<!CI'RSiVI' ~laimant8 for such 
perioll is neCl'lls8r,;°. 
[7] 1d.-OontiDuity of Possession-Tacking Successive Possessions. 
--A privity of estRte neCI!lIliary to tuck the adverse PO::l':I!'.8sion 
of the clnimnnt to that of hi!' predcce!lllors may be supplied by 
mcalls othur than thos" of deeds describing the property. 
(Di&opproving Batler \'. K"ight, 86 Cal.App. 347, 351, 260 P. 
942.) 
(8] 1d.-OontiDuity of Possession-Tacking Successive Possessions. 
-TJ,\· privity nuClt.'ssary to support the tacking of succeR.livr 
poss(!I,.ion~ of property may be ba8t'd on any connecting rel:lo 
tioDf1hip which will prevent a breaen in the adverse posse';liion 
and reInr thE- several posIIC'ssiorui to the original entry, and no 
titlt, or p written agrc·I.'ID!'nt of any kind is necessary if aetual 
possession is trnnl.lferred. 
[9] 1d. - Evidence-SuJli.ciency-Continuity of Possession.-In an 
action to quiet title to land, althou~h a tinding that the land 
W8.!i conveyed by deeds mistakenly describing the property 
did not alone support the conclusion that the privity necessary 
to tack successive possessions existed between plaintiff and his 
predecessors, the tindiDf:! did support the conclusion that plaiD-
tiff's predecessors intended to b'ansfer the land, and evidence 
that possession was actually transferred to each successive 
occupant during the five-year period supported the conclusion 
thatplainti1f and his predecessors were in continuous posses-
sion for the statutory periodo 
[10] Id.-PaJDlen1i of Tues-Evidence--8trl1iciency.-In an action 
to quit't title to land, the evidence, particularly the fact that 
the laud was assessed as improved property whereas the de-
scription on its face referred to a vacant lot, supported the 
court's detfo.rmination that the description was mistaken and 
that plaintUI and his predecessors actually paid all taxes as-
sessed for the statutory period on the land. 
(11] Id.-PaJDlent of Tues.-The fact that land was not assessed 
by its description is Dot controlling under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 325, where the adverse claimant and his predecessorI' paid 
the taxes assessed for the statutory period on the land that 
they occupiedo 
[12] Taxation - Assessment-Description of Property.-The pur-
pose of the description of land on the tax assessment rolls iii to 
notify interested persons of the taxes due on the property, 
and a person cannot complain of any mistake in the description 
where he was not misled or injured thereby. 
I 
) 
/ 
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[IS] Advene Possession - Payment of 'l'axes - Evidence - 8u!l-
ciency.-While a pr.rson claiming tit1e hy adverse possession 
must show that he and his predeeessorR act.uRlly Pllid the taxes 
aSRPssed on the particular land occupied, and ht' cannot show 
compliance with Code Civ. Proc., § 325, by merely proving that. 
he and his predecessors thought or supposed thpy were paying 
taxes on the land occupied by them whell the lands were 
assessed under a correct description that applied to otht"r land, 
eompliance with the code section is shown by substantial evi-
dence that the description on the tax assessment rolls was 
mistaken and that he and his predecessors paid taxes actually 
assessed against such 1ands. 
[14] Id.-Parment of 'l'ues.-Where a claimant of title by adverse 
possession has paid the taxes actually assessed on the property 
occupied, a misdescription on the tax assessment roll or in the 
tax receipts will not generally affect the eflicacy of payment 
under statutes requiring the payment of taxes in order to 
establish title by adverse possession. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Solano 
County. Joseph M. Raines, Judge. Affirmed. 
Consolidated actions to quiet title to real property. Judg-
ment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Ernest C. Crowley for Appellant. 
Morse &; Richards and Stanley C. Smallwood for Respond-
ent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Appellant, Manuel F. Costa, appeals from 
a judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent, Ernest T. 
Sorensen, determining the latter to be the owner of· it lot -
described as "The Westerly one-half of Lot 7, Block 51, 
Benicia, California, as the same is laid down and delineated 
on the Official Map of the City of Benicia." 
According to the evidence and the findings of the trial 
court, this litigation arose out of n "general mistake exi~ting 
as to the proper description of several lots lying in and upon 
block fifty-one as shown on the Official Map of the City· of 
Benicia, California." For m:m.y years appellant and at least 
threc-:of his ncillhbors living in Block 51 had been occupying 
land other than that (l~s(:ribl'd in their deeds. In 19·10, it was 
[14J Tax payments by nih-c)'''' ,·I:lilllnnt, note, 132A.L.R. 216, 
227. See, R180, 1 Cal.Jur. 562; 1 Am.Jur. 927. 
/ 
456 SORENSEN tI. COSTA 
discovered that the actual boundarics of the lots occupied 
by appellant and his neighbors were approximately 75 feet, 
or one-half a lot's width, to the west of the land described 
in their respective deeds. Thus, appellant had been living 
for over 40 years in a house on a lot that is actually the east 
half of Lot 8, but which his deed describes as the west balf 
of Lot 7. His next-door neighbor, respondent, has a deed de-
scribing the east half of Lot 7, but he has been occupying a 
house on land described in appellant's deed, the west half of 
Lot 7. Nettie Connolly has been in possession for many years 
of property that includes the east half of Lot 7, which is un-
improved land, and the west half of Lot 6. Her deed, however, 
describes the whole of Lot 6. The east half of Lot 6 and the 
west half of Lot 5 together constitute corner property occu-
pied by Francis Little, but his deed describes the whole of 
Lot 5, a large part of which is a street. 
At a tax sale in September, 1940, appellant purchased land 
described as the east half of Lot 8. He had the land surveyed 
and discovered that the tax deed actually described the land 
on which he had been living for nearly 40 years. A dispute 
subsequently arose between appellant and respondent with 
respect to the land occupied by respondent but described in 
appellant'8 deed, and respondent brought this action to quiet 
his title to the land in question on the ground that he had 
acquired title thereto by adverse possession. By a subsequent 
amendment to his complaint he also sought reformation of his 
deed. Appellant filed an answer and cross-complaint and 
secured an order to bring in new parties, including E. E. Rose 
and Bessie C. Rose, who claim an interest in the land in ques-
tion under a deed of trust. Meanwhile, respondent also brought 
an action against Nettie Connolly claiming title under his 
deed to the east half of Lot 7. The actions were consolidated 
for trial. Judgment was entered for respondent quieting his 
title to the land occupied by him, namely, the west half of 
Lot 7, subject to the deed of trust in favor of E. E. Rose and 
Bessie C. Rose; the judgment also determined that Nettie 
Connolly owns the land occupied by her, namely, the east 
half of Lot 7. No appeal has been taken from the part of 
the judgment quieting title in favor of Nettie Connolly. 
In 1890 L. B. Misner executed a deed to Lot 7 to E. F. Albee 
and F. M. Carson. Shortly thereafter the grantees exchanged 
deeds, dividing the lot between them. Carson received a deed 
describing the east half of Lot 7. and Albee received a deed 
describing the west half. In 1901, Albee executed a deed to 
~ 1 
/1 
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Manuel Costa likewise describing tht' west half of Lot 7, but 
Costa took possession of the east half of Lot 8 and has resided 
thereon ever since. 
In 1893, E. M. Carson executed a deed to Nicholas Nelson 
describing the east half of Lot 7. Similar deeds were executed 
by Nelson and his successors in interest, including a deed exe-
cuted in 1928 by H. C. and Myrtle Glass to George Costa, the 
son of appellant, who occupied the land until 1936, when he 
transferred possession to E. E. Rose and Bessie Rose and 
executed a deed in their favor likewise describing the adjoin-
ing land. In 1938, E. E. Rose and Bessie Rose executed a 
like deed in favor of Nicholas Kadas and Josephine Kadas. 
The land was in possession of tenants of Nicholas and Jose-
phine Kadas in March, 1940, when they executed a deed in 
favor of respondent, Ernest T. Sorenson, likeWise describing 
adjoining land. The tenants remained in possession, paying 
their rent to respondent until the termination of their tenancy, 
about six months later, when respondent went into possession. 
The trial court found that c. for more than forty years last 
past, and prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff 
Ernest T. Sorenson and his predecessors of title, have been in 
actual possession" of the property in question; that "from 
the year 1898, to the date of the commencement of this action, 
due to the mistake of the several Grantees and Grantors of 
said real property, the same has been mistakenly described 
in the several conveyances thereof, including the conveyance 
to plaintiff herein, as the East one-half (E lh) of Lot Seven 
(7), Block Fifty-one (51), City of Benicia, California, in-
stead of the west one-half (W lh) of Lot Seven, Block Fifty-
one (51), City of Benicia, California." 
With respect to the payment of taxes, the trial court found 
that for many years "and partictllarly during the five year 
period prior to the commencement of this action, the real 
property hereinabove described . . . has been described on 
the tax assessment roDs of both the Oounty of Solano, and 
the Oity of Benecia, Oalifornia, as the East one-half (E lh) 
of Lot Seven (7) Block Fifty-one (51), City of Benicia, Oali-
fornia and that all taxes assessed by the County of Solano 
and Oity of Benicia, California, against said property have 
been assessed against plaintiff, Ernest T. Sorenson and his 
predecessors in possession and occupation of said real prop-
erty . . ." The court also found that both appellant and 
respondent and their predecessors •• have . paid all of the 
I 
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taxes assessed by the City of Benicia and the County of Solano, 
against the properties actually occupied by them." 
In addition, the trial court found that respondent" and his 
preuecessors in interest have since the 19th day of Aliril, 1890, 
been in actual possession" of the property in question .. and 
have ever since the last date ... occupied, used and culti-
vated said land, having and keeping the sam£' surrounded 
by a substantial enclosure, using and claiming the same in 
their own right from that date to the present time adversely, 
to all the world. " 
[1] A person claiming title to property by adverse posses-
sion must establish his claim under either section 322 or 
under sections 324 and 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Adverse possession under section 322 is based on what is 
eommonly referred to as .color of title. In order to establish 
a title under this section it is necessary to show that tbe 
elaimant or "those under wbom he claims, entered into pos-
session of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other 
rigbt, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as 
being a conveyance of the property in question, or upon the 
decree or judgment of a competent court, and that ther£' has 
been a continued occupation and posst>ssion of the property 
included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some 
part of the property . . . for five years . . . so included. 
• • ." Since the deeds in question did not include the land 
occupied, adverse possession thereof is governed by sections 
324 and 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Park v. Power., 
2 Ca1.2d 590, 594 f42 P.2d 75].) 
. Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 
" [w ] here it appears that there has been an actual continued 
occupation of land, under a claim of title, exclusive of any 
other right, but not founded upon a written instrument., judg-
ment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and DO other, is 
de£'med to have been held adversely"t Section 325 provides 
that "For the purpose of constituting an adverse poss£'RSion 
by a person claiminl! title, not fonnded upon a written instru-
ment, judgment, or decrt>e. land is d£'emed to have been 
posses~ed and occupied in the folJo,ving cases only: 
(1 ) Where it has been protected by a snbstantial in-
elosure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
·'Provided, howev£'r. that in no cas£' shall adv£'rse poss£'ssion 
be (!onsidf'red pstablislH'd llndpr th£' proyi!:ions of any section 
or st'ctio1Jsof this code. nnl('ss it shaUbe shown tlIat the land 
) 
:) 
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bas been occupied and claimed for the period of five years 
continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and 
grantors, have paid all the taxes, !'Itate, county, or r.lUuicipal, 
which have been levied and assessed upon such land." 
The trial court found that the land was occupied continu-
ously by respondent and his predecessors for more than Ih·o 
years; that throughout that period it was prot~cted by :1 Rub-
stantial enclosure and usual1y cultivated; and that :ill tht' 
taxes assessed thereon had been paid hy respondent :md his 
predecessors. AppelJant contends, however, thnt respondent 
is precluded, as a matter of law, from cstabJishin~ title by 
adverse possession. Appel1ant's contentions ill t,his regard mny 
bE' classified under the fonowin~ beadings: (1) That the 
mutual mistake of the parti('s precluded respondent from 
establishing the adverse character of the pOSllcssion of tile 
property by him and his predecessors; (2) that the bet that 
the deeds held by respondf'nt and hi!! predC'cesc;ors froiled t.o 
describe the lund in question precluded him from showing 
continuity of possession for thp 8tat11tory period; (3) thnt 
respondent did not prove thnt he find his predN!(,sSOl'R p!lid 
all the taxes assessed on the land in question during the 
statutory period. 
THE ADVERSE CHARACTER OF TJtE POSSESSION 
Appellant contends that as s nt.'\tter of L'\w respondent 
could not have acquired title by adverse posc;cs.'Iion because the 
mutual mistake of the parties for the fltntutory period p~ 
eluded respondent from showinr. t11nt thl! posscssion \I:as haR-
tile or adverse to the rights of the record owner •• \ sir.rllnr 
contention was rejected by this court in Waadtcard v. F'ari&, 
109 Cal. 12, 17 [41 P. 781}. [2] The requirement of "hos-
tility" relied on by appellant (see West v. EtJ4tl8, 29 Cal.2d 
414, 417 [175 P.2d 219]) means, not that the parties must 
ha ve a dispute as to the title durinlr the period of pos.'Icssion, 
but that the claimant's posscssion must be ndverse tl) th.> 
record owner, "unaccompanied by nny recognition, express 
or inferable from the circumstnnCt.>S of the rill'ht in tIl(" latter." 
(4 Tiffany, Real Property faded.), 425.) Appellnnt's ~Oll­
tention that respondent's possession WIlS not adverse is bnSl'c\ 
on the Rtntemcnt in Holzer v. Read. 216 Cal. 119. 123 f13 
P.2d 697], that "wlll'refllC' oe('lIpation of Innd is by Ii ll!r-re 
mistake, and with 11.0 illt(!11tion on the 1>m·t af fhr occ1t7Jfmi ff) 
claim as his oum. lImd which (lops not b<:,long to him. hnt with 
the intention to claim only to th(· I rnc line wherever it may be, 
l 
./ 
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the holding is not adverse." (Italics added.] Thllt Nt.:lt'!Jnl'ut 
js not applicable to the present CRSe, for th~ trial court iound 
on the basis of substantial evidence that respondent amI his 
predecessors did claim the land as their own and held it 
"adversely to all the world." The Holzer case involved a 
different situation, Ii dispute as to boundaries, that turned on 
the question whether the occupier in occupying up to a certain 
line intended to claim the land included in the record title 
of his neighbor or to claim only whatever land was described 
in his own deed. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 322, 324.) The 
trial court found that he intended to claim only the land de-
flcribed in his deed, and this court affirmed the judgment on 
the ground that in the absence of an intention to claim the 
land in dispute as his own, his possession was not adverse. On 
t.he other hand, in Woodward v.FaN, ntpra, 109 Cal. 12, 17, 
this court expressly held that if the claimant intends to claim 
the area occupied as his land, the mere fact that the claim was 
based on mistake does not preclude him from acquiring title 
by adverse possession. [8] Since the Woodward case, it has 
been an established rule in this state that U Title by adverse 
possession may be acquired through the possession or use 
commenced under mistake." (Park v. Powers, supra, 2 Cal.2d 
590, 596; Lucas v. Provines, 130 Cal. 270, 272 [62 P. 509] ; 
see ~ Cal.Jur. 578; cases from other jurisdictions collected, 
97 A.L.R. 14, 58; 4 Tiffany, Real Property [ntpra], § 1159; 
1 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property, § 19.) 
[4] Nor is there any merit to appellant's contention that 
if adverse possession may be based on a mistaken entry, the 
period of the statute of limitations runs only from the dis-
covery of the mistake. Appellant relies on Breen v. Donnelly, 
74 Cal. 301, 305 [15 P. 845] and a dictum in Marsicono v. 
l.1uning, 19 Cal.App. 334, 336 [125 P. 1083]. The case of 
Breen v. Donnelly, supra, is not in point. for it involved the 
application of the statute of limitations to an action for relief 
on the ground of fraud or mistake under section 338 (4) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. Section SS8 (4) provides that in 
such a case the cause of action for purposes of the statute of 
limitations is deemed not to accrue until the discovery of 
facts constituting the fraud or mistake. The section is an 
express exception to the general rule that the statute of limita-
tions begins to run when the cause of action actually accrues. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) A cause of action for the recovery 
of real property aeeru~ when the owner is deprived of pos-
..... ion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 318,321.) "Occupancy for the 
-) 
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pcriod prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as suffi-
cicut to bar any aetioll for the recovery of the property con-
fers a titk thereto ... sufficient against all .... " (Civ. 
Codc, § 1007.) The dictum in Marsicano v. Luning, 19 Cal. 
App. 334, 336 [125 P. 1083], that the period of adverse pos-
sef.sion does not commence to run until the discovery of the 
mistake, must be disapproved, for it is not only inconsistent 
with the statut~ of this sta1c but is directly contrary to the 
holding of this court in W vodward v. Faris, supra, 109 Cal. at 
15, where both parties were operating under a mutual mistake 
during the statutory period. 
[6] Appellimt also conttmds that the mutual mistake pre-
cludes respondent from showing that his possession and that 
of his predecessors was under "such circumstances as to con-
stitute reasonabl", noticc to the owner." (Wed v. Evans, 
supra, 29 Ca1.2d 414, 417.) App~lll\.nt has evidently miscon-
strued the foregoing langual!'e to mean that a person claiminJ! 
title by adverse possession must establish that the record owner 
knew of his o",n righbl in the lund in question. All that the 
claimant must show, however, is that his occupation was snch 
as to constitnte reasonable notice to the true owner that he 
claimed the land 88 hi8 own. The fnc. .. t thnt the record owner 
was unaware of his own right...; in the land is immaterial. 
(Wood v. Davidson, 62 CnLApp.2d 885, 889. [145 P.2d 659J; 
McLeod v. Reyu, 4 Cal.App.2d 143, 157 [40 P.2d 839] ; Mon-
tecito Valley Co. v. Banta Barbara, 144 Cal. 578 [77 P. 1113; 
additional eases collected, 1 Cal.Jur. 550; 4 Tiffany, Renl 
Property, supra, § 1140.) In the present ease there can bt· no 
question under the findings of the trial court that the occu-
pation of respondent and his predecessors wus such as to C(In-
jstitute reasonabl~ notice that thoy claimed the land as their 
own. 
CONTINlnTY OF POSSESSION 
[6] Under section 325 of the Cod" of Civil Procedure, rl'-
spondent was required to prov", that "the land had been occu-
pied and claimed for the period of five years continuously." 
Sinct! respondent did not h.im8elf possess or occupy thtl land 
for five years, it was nt'cessary for him to rely on the posses-
sions o{ his predecessors to establish continuous possession for 
the five-year period. In order to tack one person's possession 
to that of another, some form of privity between successive 
claimants for the five-year period is necessary. (Ban Francf'sco 
.. ) 
/ 
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Y. Ji'uZde,37 Cal. 349.853 [99 Am.Dec. 278] ; Meier v. Meier, 
71 Ca1.App.2d 502, 507 (162 P.2d 950].) Appellant contends 
that respondent failed to establish the necessary privity. 
The trial court found that respondent "and his predecessors 
in title, have been in possession and occupied the west one-half 
(W lh) of Lot Seven . . . by virtue and under deed describ-
ing their said property as the East one-half (E lh) of Lot 
Seven. . ... " from the year 1893 to thc datc of thc eomm~nce­
ment of the action. 
The trial court found tha.t respondent and "his predeces-
sors in title n have been in possession of the property in ques-
tion by virtue of deeds mistakenly describing the propurty 
as the east one-half of Lot 7 for more than the statutory period 
and that the land in question \\'~ conveyed to plaintUf and his 
predecessors by dt.-eds describing the adjoining property. Since 
respondent's claim of title by adverse possession cannot be 
based on a written instrument, it Ulllst be supported, if at all, 
under Code of Civil Proctldure sections 324 and 325, which 
do not require a written instrument. The question remains 
'fI.'hat privity other than that based on a deed describing the 
land will supply the necessary continuity of po~ssion between 
respondent and his predecessors for the five-year period pre-
ceding the commencement of this nction. 
[7] Relying on Mc:sser v. Hwernia Samngs Society, 149 
Cal. 122, 128 (84 P. 835]. and V Otl N eind.orll v. Schallock, 2] 
Cal.App.2d 44, 48 [68 P.2d 278], app~llo.nt contends that ollly 
a deed deareribing the land claimed will supply the necessary 
privity. Although the cases rdied on contain statements to 
that effect, the actual holdings are not inconsistent with thl' 
view that privity may be supplied by other moans. In both 
cases the claimant attemp~d to support his claim of OOV\lr&c 
possession by a deed excluding the land claimed, and it \VauI 
beld that such deeds did not supply the necessary privity. In 
the Von Neindorff case, 81£pra, 21 Cal.App.2d 44. 48. the court 
stated that a person claiming title to land by adverse posses-
sion •• cannot tack to the time of his possession that of a pr~­
vious holder where the land claimed adversely was not included 
within the boundaries of the conveyance he received from such 
previous holder. tt The court stated as the reason for this rule 
that "otherwise a person receiving a conveyance of a part 
of lands occupied by a predecessor might use th(> possl'ssion 
of that predecessor of another part of the land to d~f('.nt the 
rigbts of that predecessor with l'CSPCCt to that part of tlw land 
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which he intended to keep for himself. The rule is particu-
larly appropriate in a case such as this where the land, the 
predecessor's possession of which is relied upon, was particu-
larly excepted from the conveyance made by the predecessor." 
This statement of the reason for the rule and its application to 
the facts of the Von Neindorff and Messer cases shows that 
the rule was too broadly stated in those cases. The reasonint:l' 
supports, at most, a rule designed to protect the claimant's 
pr(.de<:l~l:isor where he transfers by deed a part but not all of 
the land he possessed. It h3li no application to a situation 
where the deed dcscribl!s none of the land posscSl:icd by the 
claimant's predecessor and the predecessor has transferred 
possession and attempted to transfer title to all of the land 
that he possessed. In such a situation the deed to land pos-
Rcsscd by neithcr the prl!Scnt claimant nor his predecessors 
docs· not preclude a cL'lim by the person in possession to the 
lnnd occupied. 
Appellant r\}lies also on "Wen v. McKay cf: 00., 120 Cal. 
332 [52 P. 828], :md Saner v. Knight, 66 Cal.App. 347 [260 P. 
942]. The court's only comnll'nt rl'lcvantto the problem of 
privity in the Allen case, however, is that "it may be further 
suggested that a privity of estate is absolutely nec('Ssary before 
various periods of "dverl:il! POSsc's.'>ion Cl'eatl;d by different 
parties mny be tllcked togl~ther, und, as to the land in contro-
versy, thl! existence of such prhity . . . is not entirely plain." 
The court did not define the term ,. prhity of estate," and 
there is no reason to assume that the eourt intended to usc 
this term as restricted to privity between transferel'S by deed. 
(See Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possess-ion, 32 IIarv.L.Rcv. 
185, 147.) In Saner v. Knight, 66 Cal.App. 347, 351 [260 P. 
942], it W:18 held th:~t deed'! describing the property were suf-
ficient to establish the privity nectlSSary to tack the adverse 
possLossion of the claimant to that of his predecessors. Although 
the court assumed t.hnt. privity might not bc. establish~d by 
othcr means, :my l:mguage in the opinion Rupporting such a 
rule was unncecssary to the decision in that case and is dis-
approved. 
[8] The requirement of privity between several possessors 
of land is bnscd on the theory that "The several occupancies 
must be so· cODDC"cted that each occupant can go back to the 
original entry or holding as a source of title. The successive 
occupants must elaim through and under their predecessors 
/ 
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and not independent1y to mal\e a continuous holding unitp.d 
into one ground of action." (Ballantine, supt'a, 32 Harv.L. 
Rev. 135, 147.) For this reason it is generally hcld that the 
plivity necessary to support the tacking of successive posses-
sions of property may be based upon "any connecting rela-
tionship which will prevent a breach in the adverse possession 
and refer thc several possessions to the origInal entry, and for 
this purpose no written transfer or agreement is necessary." 
(4 Tiffany, Real Property, supra, 434; Illinois Steel Co. v. 
l'aczocka, 139 Wis. 23,28 [119 N.W. 550] ; Gregory v. Thorrez, 
277 Mich. 197, 200 [269 N.W. 142] ; Bonds v. Smith, 143 F.2d 
369, 371; cases collected 46 A..L.R. 792, 795; Ballantine, supra, 
32 Harv.L.Rev. 135, 147-159;5 Thompson on Real Property 
[Perm. ed.], 468; 1 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real 
Property, supra, § 23.) "It is possession not title which is vital 
• . • privity may exist where one by agreement sUITenders his 
possession to another in such manner that no interruption or 
interval occurs between the two possessions without a recorded 
conveyance, or even without writing of any kind if actual 
possession is transferred. " (Bonds v. Smith, supra, 143 F.2d 
369,371.) 
[9] In the present case, although the finding that the land 
in question was conveyed by deeds mistakenly describing the 
property does not alone support the eonelusion that the priv-
ity necessary to tack successive possessions· existed between 
respondent and his predecessors, it does support the conclusion 
that respondent's predecessors intended to transfer the land in 
question. There is no question that the evidence before the 
trial eourt showed that possession to the land in question was 
actually transferred to each successive occupant during the 
five-year period. It therefore folloWR that the conclusion of 
the trial conrt. that the respondent and his predecessors were 
in continuous posses.cdon for the statutory period must be 
sustained. 
PAYMENT OF TAXES 
The trial eourt found that the land occupied by respondent, 
the west half of Lot 7, is improved land, whereas the east half 
of Lot 7 described in respondent's deed is unimproved, and 
that through a general mistake, thc improved lot occupied by 
respondent" has been generally known and described in and 
about the City of Baneeia" as the cast half of Lot 7, an un· 
improved part. of the propert.y occupied by Nettie Connolly. 
The (~lIur1 found that this same mistake was made on the 
J 
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assessment rolls and that the propcrty occupied by respondent 
has been described in the tax assessment rolls of both the city 
and county as the east balf of Lot 7 and assessed to respondent 
and his predecessors as improved property. The court there-
fore determined that respondent and his predecessors have 
paid all the taxes that have been assessed on the property 
actually occupied by them for the five-year period before the 
commencement of the action. 
[10] Thus, all interested persons have mistakenly believed 
during the statutory period that the description of the land 
and improvements on the tax assessment rolls referred to t.he 
land occupied by respondent, when, in fact, the description 
erroneously referred to certain unimproved property. The 
evidence before the trial court, particularly the fact that the 
land was assessed as improved property whereas the descrip-
tion on its face referred to a vacant lot, supports the trial 
court's determination tbat the description was mistaken and 
that the respondent and his predecessors actually paid all 
taxes assessed for the statutory period on the land that they 
occupied. 
[11] Appellant contends that the description on the tax 
assessment rons is controlling, and that as a matter of law 
the respondent must have paid taxes only on the land described 
on the assessment rolls. This court has held, bowever, tbat 
the fact that land was not assessed by its description is not 
controlling under section 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
(Ward Redwood Co. v. Fortain, 16 Ca1.2d 34, 44 [104 P.2d 
813].) [12] The purpose of the description on the tax assess-
ment rons is to notify interested parties of the taxes due on tbe 
property, and appellant cannot complain of any mistake in 
the description unless be was misled thereby. (San Francisco 
v. San Mateo Oounty, 17 Cal.2d 814, 819 [112 P.2d 595]; 
E. E. ltfcCalla Co. v. Sleeper, 105 Cal.App. 562, 567 [288 P. 
146] ; Biaggi v. Phillips, 50 Cal.App.2d 92, 98 [122 P.2d 619) ; 
see also Lmnmer v. Unruh, 25 Cal.App. 97, 103-104 [142 P. 
914].) Since appellant as well as other interested parties at 
the time the taxes in question were assessed also understood 
that the taxes related to the property occupied, he could not 
have been misled thereby. Hc was not injured by the mistake 
in the description, for at the time he did not know that he had 
any C'laim to the land in qupstion and paid taxes on the prop-
ert~· hr wa~ orrl1}1ying a~~rs.<;pn lmnPT n similar mistakC' in 
descriptiun. [13] App<,lJant (~oJlteJlds, however, that reo 
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spondent cannot rely on his own mist akt' and that of his prede. 
cessors as to the payment of taxes on the wrong land. There 
is no question that a person claiming title by adverse posses· 
sion must show that he and his predecessors actually paid the 
taxes assessed on the particular land occupied, and he cannot 
show compliance with section 325 of the Code of Civil Pro· 
cedure by merely proving that he and bis predecessors 
"thought or supposed they were paying taxes" on the land 
occupied by them, when the lands were assessed under a cor-
rect description that applied to other land. (Standard Quick-
silver 00. v. Habtskaw, 132 Cal. 115,124 [64 P. 113] ; Reynolds 
v. Willard, 80 Cal. 605, 608 [22 P. 262J.) In the present case, 
however, the respondent proved by substantial evidence that 
the description on the tax assess:c.ent rolls was mistaken and 
that he and his predecessors not only thought that they were 
pa.ying taxes on the land occupied but in fact paid taxes actu-
ally assessed against such lemds. 
Appellnntalso relies on certain cases involving boundary 
disputE'.s betwctln adjoining landowners, in which the courts 
have denied ciaulis of titl~ by advcrst', possession up to the 
boundaries of the land occupied, on the ground that the claim-
ant faiJed to establish payment of taxes on the disputed part 
of the occupied land by tax receipts that failed to describe 
the land. (Sel! Freidman v. Southern Calif. T. Co., 179 Cal. 
266 [176 P. 442J ; Mann v. Mann, 152 CaL 23, 29 [91 P. 994J ; 
Wilder v. Nicol.a1Is, 50 Cal.App. 776 [195 P. 1068]; Johnson 
v. But1t, 7 Cal.App.2d 197, 202 [46 P.2d 771].) In none of 
these eases, however, docs it appear that the claimant showed 
that the' descriptions on the tax recciptc; were erroneous and 
that he actually paid the taxes assessed on the land in contro-
versy. [14] Where a claimant of title by adverse possession 
has paid the taxes actually asse.st!ed on the property occupied, 
a misdescription on the tax assessment roll or in the tax re-
ccipts will not generally affect t.he efficacy of payment under 
HtatuteS requiring the payment of taxes in order to establish 
title by adve]'l;e possession. (W cst Chicago Park Commi.~­
sioners v. Coleman, 108 Ill. 591, 598; W. D. Clcvdand &- Sons 
v. Smith (Tex.Civ.App.), 156 S.W. 247, 251; cases collected 
2 C.J .S. 752; 13~ A.L.R. 216, 227.) Even if the de-
scriptions on the tax receipts arc iusufficil'nt hy themselves 
to identify thl' property, as far as the rc.quirllll l 'uts of adverse 
possession arc involved, the claimant lllay ~how by other cvi· 
dence that til{' particular lanel occupied was u~!'n:scd, and the 
) 
) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
) 
Aug. 1948] CoUNTY OF MARIPOSA V. MERCED In. DIST. 467 
[32 c.zcs tfi11 186 P.Id 1201 
taxes were paid by him or his p"l'dccl""-'1ors. (S('(' Bmnr.ll v. 
Lee, 373 Ill. 333 [26 N.E.2d88] ; ace also Lttm'mcr v. Unruh, 
fltpra, 25 Cal.App. 97, 104:.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schnut'l', J. t 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant'. petition for a reheariDg was denied September 
20,194:8. 
